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THE CAREFUL USE OF
COMPARATIVE LAW DATA:




I am not a comparative lawyer and I was somewhat surprised to be
invited to open this conference with a lecture on comparative law
methodology. I had the impression that comparative law and academics
entered that field of endeavor to exploit previously acquired expertise in
the laws of a foreign country. Comparatists are convinced that the
knowledge of foreign laws and legal institutions is valuable. Yet, more
than legal scholars in any other field, they struggle to define the purpose
to which their knowledge should be applied. The objectives of
comparative law are sometimes divided into practical and scientific aims.'
The usually cited practical objectives are (a) to facilitate communication
between participants of various systems, (b) to provide the framework for
the harmonization of national laws and the interpretation and application
of supranational laws, and (c) to inform domestic law reform by evaluating
the experience of foreign systems. 2 The scientific aims are stated in more
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1. MARY ANN GLENDON ET. AL., COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS 9 (1985).
2. See Max Rheinstein, Comparative Law-Its Functions, Methods and Usages, 22 ARK.
L. REV. 415 (1968); RUDOLPH B. SCHLESINGER ET. AL., COMPARATIVE LAW 2-8, 17-41 (5th ed.
1988); GLENDON, supra note 1, at 9.
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general terms: (a) to understand the relationships between law and the
social, economic, historical, political and cultural context in which it
operates and (b) to reveal the existence and relevance, if any, of universal
principles of law. In the latter more academic vein, the study of foreign
legal systems by comparatists produces an enormous amount of data that
is of great potential value in the study of legal theory. Unfortunately, this
empirical enterprise has been compromised by two problems that
comparatists have yet to address: the absence of falsifiable hypotheses and
the tendency to construct theories ex post to fit the observed data
(sometimes known as data mining).
For some time, comparative law scholars have emphasized the merits
of a functional approach to comparing legal systems. The leading
casebooks refer to this approach as examining law in action rather than law
in the books.3 If societies are viewed as systems which seek to enhance
the collective welfare of their respective members, they may face the same
types of challenges and yet respond with different combinations of legal
and extralegal techniques. Thus, a comparatist should examine the
combined operation of law and other mechanisms of pli'iate ordering and
social control.4 Notwithstanding this emphasis on functional analysis,
comparative law scholars are traditionally generalists in that their inquiries
tend to cut across several areas of law. Although a broad interest in law
may seem more conducive to the search for universal principles,
specialization in a given area of law facilitates a priori theorizing and
thereby discourages ex post rationalizations of comparative data.
Specialists in specific areas of law can test the theories they have
developed by studying their national systems (and perhaps one or two
others) against the experiences in a broader set of foreign systems. This
ensures that specialists construct a priori hypotheses from their
understanding of lawmaking processes in their home system(s), and that
these hypotheses are uncontaminated by observations of data from foreign
systems. Recently, comparative analysis has attracted the attention of
American corporate law scholars who have been intrigued by the
governance systems of Japan and Germany, 5 as well as the opportunity to
participate in the law making process in countries emerging from centrally
3. GLENDON, supra note 1, at 11; see also SCHLESINGER, supra note 2, at 880-90.
4. See, e.g., 0. Kahn-Freund, Comparative Law as an Academic Subject, 82 L.Q. REv.
40, 45-52, 55-58 (1966).
5. See Ronald J. Gilson & Mark J. Roe, Understanding the Japanese Keiretsu: Overlaps
Between Corporate Governance and Industrial Organization, 102 YALE L.J. 871 (1993);
Mark J. Roe, Some Differences in Corporate Structure in Germany, Japan, and the United
States, 102 YALE L.J. 1927 (1993) [hereinafter Roe, Some Differences].
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planned economies.6 The organizers of this conference have also chosen
the approach of field-specific comparative analysis in the areas of corporate
law and bankruptcy. The conference promises to reveal a great deal of
information about the laws and legal institutions in other countries.
Moreover, by focusing the discussion on a set of practical problems, the
organizers have encouraged the participants to describe how their various
systems function in fact, rather than merely restate (or translate) relevant
legislative provisions. Nevertheless, at the end of the day, we continue to
face a significant danger of overstating the conclusions we mine from the
data that are no more than hypotheses at this stage about the evolution of
corporate and bankruptcy law.
While a significant amount of scholarly comparative analysis has been
undertaken in corporate law, less has occurred in the area of insolvency.7
Bankruptcy scholarship, however, is sufficiently rich in theory that we
should be able to generate falsifiable hypotheses to be tested against data
produced in this conference and elsewhere. Insolvency scholars have
proposed various explanations of bankruptcy based on observations of the
American system: for example, that bankruptcy effects a desired
redistribution from secured lenders to other corporate stakeholders 8 or that
reorganization procedures provide a cushion for employees and managers
of firms in contracting industries. Most recently, a theory of insolvency
law is evolving that views bankruptcy as a corporate governance
mechanism. Perhaps because my interest in bankruptcy has evolved from
earlier research into patterns of debt financing, I have subscribed to a
governance view of bankruptcy. 9 Through terms of repayment, covenants,
events of default, acceleration and enforcement rights, debt contracts
impose a discipline on corporate decision makers that complements other
governance mechanisms controlled by shareholders, or arising from the
factor, product and capital markets in which the corporation operates.
When shareholders and equity markets have failed to address managerial
slack in a firm, control passes to debtholders either through exercise of
6. See, e.g., Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate
Law, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1911 (1996).
7. Several very good comparative studies have been published in bankruptcy law. See,
e.g., CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE INSOLVENCY LAW (Jacob S.
Ziegel ed. 1994); Theodore Eisenberg & Shochi Tagashira, Should We Abolish Chapter
II? The Evidence from Japan, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 111 (1994).
8. See, e.g., Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 775 (1987).
9. See George G. Triantis & Ronald J. Daniels, The Role of Debt in Interactive
Corporate Governance, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1073 (1995); George G. Triantis, Debt Financing,
Corporate Decision Making and Security Design, 26 CAN. Bus. L.J. 93 (1996).
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their individual creditor rights or in a collective process in bankruptcy. In
this sense, bankruptcy procedures may be thought of as last-resort
governance mechanisms. Many features of insolvency and bankruptcy
laws in the U.S. and Canada are structured to correct slack and improve
managerial decision making.'" The study of foreign insolvency systems
permits a more rigorous testing of various hypotheses that may be
generated from a bankruptcy-as-governance theory. These hypotheses
should be falsifiable and have predictive power. Starting from an
assumption that governance mechanisms are needed whenever corporate
decision makers do not fully bear the costs and benefits of their decisions,
a set of hypotheses might predict the existence of a limited number of
combinations of governance rules and institutions and thereby exclude the
possibility of other patterns. In particular, we might conjecture as to the
nature and role of bankruptcy within these configurations. To give a
simple example, bankruptcy reorganization structures are more likely to be
found where there are developed public equity and debt markets and a
sophisticated judiciary (as in the U.S.), and less likely to be used (even if
they exist in the books) in countries where ownership and debtholdings are
concentrated and courts are less sophisticated.
!1. COMPARATIVE LAW METHODOLOGY
The exercise of comparative law is the identification and explanation
of similarities and differences among legal systems. Observations of
similarities and differences can inform or provide support for theories
about the role of the law in society. Three brief examples illustrate the
point. First, a legal philosopher who postulates a natural law based on
universal principles is comforted by evidence of uniformity among systems.
Second, from a functional perspective, a comparatist begins with the
premise that societies face the same problems and they address these
challenges through sometimes different combinations of legal and
extralegal mechanisms, though often with similar outcomes. The rules of
law, legal institutions, combinations of legal and extralegal forces, and
10. See Lynn M. LoPucki & George G. Triantis, A Systems Approach to Comparing
U.S. and Canadian Reorganization of Financially Distressed Companies, 35 HARV. INT'L L.J.
267 (1994); George G. Triantis, The Interplay Between Liquidation and Reorganization in
Bankruptcy: The Role of Screens, Gatekeepers and Guillotines, 16 INT'L REV. L. & ECON.
101 (1996) [hereinafter Triantis, The Interplay]; George G. Triantis, A Theory of the
Regulation of Debtor-in-Possession Financing, 46 VAND. L. REV. 901 (1993); George G.
Triantis, The Effect of Insolvency and Bankruptcy on Contract Performance and
Adjustment, 43 U. TORONTO L.J. 679 (1993).
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even the result of this combination may differ among societies. Third, a
legal historian, anthropologist or sociologist expects that laws are molded
by or reflect social phenomena. These observers are more intrigued by
differences across geography, time and culture. To them, the shape of law
and legal institutions is determined by context and the presence of
similarities across significant discrepancies in context may be simply
accidental.
Two of the more prominent recent explanations for similarities are the
transplant and efficiency theories. The former claims that law is made by
elite groups of lawyers who are keen to adopt the rules and institutions
from those systems they regard as prestigious, and who care little about the
functional consequences in their own systems." The efficiency theory also
predicts a high degree of uniformity, but with the opposite argument: legal
rules and institutions are driven by functional imperatives and tend to
evolve toward efficient solutions to societal problems. The systematic
convergence of laws over time that is predicted by both transplant and
efficiency theories is at best equivocally supported by observations of
comparative law that also reveal many instances of diversity in legal rules.
Indeed, at the most basic level, two societies may not even view the same
phenomenon as being problematic.'
2
The transplant and efficiency theories have been qualified to
accommodate observations of diversity. Ugo Mattei suggests that there is
an international market for legal ideas.' 3 Societies are both producers and
consumers of legal mechanisms that address challenges to the collective
welfare. An efficient solution can evolve independently in various
societies, but it can also move from producer to consumer through
associations among lawyers and policy makers. Legal transplants avoid the
costs of duplicative law production. However, the migration of an efficient
legal rule from one system to another can be blocked by what Mattei calls
11. This theory is proposed and elaborated by Alan Watson in a large number of
publications. See, e.g., ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE
LAW (1974).
12. See, e.g., Jonathan Hill, Comparative Law, Law Reform and Legal Theory, 9
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 101, 108 (1989). "The Soviet legal system, for example, as a result
of its ideological biases, faces the 'problem' of how to prevent citizens from acquiring
unearned income through the purchase and resale of consumer goods at a profit .... In
Western legal systems, however, the resale of goods at a profit is regarded as legitimate
economic activity." Id.
13. Ugo Mattei, Efficiency in Legal Transplants: An Essay in Comparative Law and
Economics, 14 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 3 (1994).
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at various times, legal parochialism, tradition or ideology in the receiving
society.
Mattei's efficient transplant theory is not contradicted by the observed
patterns of similarities and differences. Indeed, his theory could fit a wide
spectrum of possible observations. His thesis is that the market for legal
ideas promotes efficient transplants except where they are blocked by
parochialism, ideology or tradition. The qualification makes the theory
malleable and somewhat tautological. A more creditable attempt to
produce falsifiable theory of private law is made by Saul Levmore, who
begins with the premise that societies face similar problems that threaten
their stability and general welfare. He therefore expects to and does find
a substantial amount of uniformity in tort and property rules that maximize
collective welfare. The driving force toward such uniformity seems to be
an evolutionary process that selects for the fittest societies. Levmore
explains variety as existing in rules (a) that ultimately lead to similar
behavioral effects or (b) over which reasonable lawmakers could disagree
over which is the best. 4 Although Levmore seems to suggest that cost-
effectiveness in controlling inefficient behavior is the metric for predicting
uniformity or variety in any type of rulemaking, the question of whether
in any given case reasonable lawmakers could disagree over the best rule
is subject to some ex post rationalization. In less capable hands, it would
be tempting to identify a close call in order to explain differences in laws.
Levmore heightens this problem by suggesting that other factors, such as
cultural influences and attitudes toward wealth distribution may come into
play when reasonable people could disagree about the relative efficiency
merits of various rules.' 5
It is common in the social sciences to assess a theory by its predictive
power: that is, its capacity to predict phenomena of which the theory's
architect was not aware at the time the theory was constructed.t 6 Yet, one
14. Saul Levmore, Rethinking Comparative Law: Variety and Uniformity in Ancient
and Modem Tort Law, 61 TUL. L. REV. 235 (1986) [hereinafter Levmore, Rethinking
Comparative Law]; Variety and Uniformity in the Treatment of the Good-Faith Purchaser,
16 J. LEGAL STUD. 43 (1987); Waiting for Rescue: An Essay on the Evolution and Incentive
Structure of the Law, 72 VA. L. REV. 879 (1986).
15. Levmore, Rethinking Comparative Law, supra note 14, at 239. Although he
expressly declines to endorse "any specific view of the development and evolution of legal
rules," he asserts that his analysis "most readily supports a position that combines an
emphasis on law as 'a device shaped by the members of society in response to internal
conditions in the search for ways and means to translate their basic social postulates into
action' with a view that changes [of these postulates) are stimulate when a culture's rules
are not consonant with its survival." Id. (quoting E. HOEBEL, THE LAW OF PRIMITIVE MAN
327 (1954).
16. Milton Friedman has stated that "theory is to be judged by its predictive power for
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needs some experience with the matter being explained in order to develop
a tentative hypothesis. There are sophisticated methods of data
experimentation that allow the production of a small number of explanatory
variables from a set of data (rather than a priori), but they are complex and
one needs to be cautious and conservative in stating the significance of the
results. 17 The more straightforward approach is to use part of the data for
hypothesis production and the other part for testing the predictive force of
the hypothesis. 18 Jonathan Hill observes the following:
the data which comparative law provides can be of some
assistance in verifying (or falsifying) legal theory .... If
comparative law provides limited support for a variety of theories,
rather than unequivocally endorsing any particular philosophy,
this might be thought to reveal something about both the complex
nature of law, and the limited explanatory power of any model or
theory which is designed to illuminate the essence of legal
phenomena.' 9
This counsels in favor of a modest functional approach. Experts
within defined areas of law should construct hypotheses based on
experience in their own countries and then test them against the data from
foreign systems.
Considerable progress in this respect has been made recently in the
area of corporate law. Corporate governance scholars have taken the first
steps toward generating hypotheses about the evolution of corporate law
by looking at the systems of three countries: Japan, Germany and the
U.S.2° Based on observations of differences in the governance structures
of corporations in the U.S. and the other two countries, corporate scholars
have produced a theory of path dependent evolution.2' The laws and
the class of phenomena which it is intended to 'explain' . . . [the theory's predictions] may
be about phenomena that have occurred but observations on which have not yet been made
or are not known to the person making the prediction." MILTON FRIEDMAN, ESSAYS IN
POSITIVE ECONOMICS 8-9 (1969).
17. See, e.g., Michael C. Lovell, Data Mining, 65 REV. ECON. & STAT. 1 (1983).
18. One needs to be careful also when the same data set is subject to a sequence of
empirical studies undertaken by many individuals. Future research is often motivated by
the successes and failures of past investigations and over time, and it may be difficult to
correct for the consequent bias in hypothesis selection. See Andrew W. Lo & A. Craig
MacKinlay, Data Snooping Biases in Tests of Financial A sset Pricing Models, 3 REV. FIN.
STUD. 431 (1990).
19. Jonathan Hill, Comparative Law, Law Reform and Legal Theory, 9 OXFORD J. LEGAL
STUDIES 101, 112-13 (1989).
20. See, e.g., Roe, Some Differences, supra note 5.
21. See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Path Dependence in Corporate
1997]
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
institutions of each country evolve along a path that is generally
determined by moves from less to more efficient positions, but that is
periodically bumped by the forces of culture and politics. This framing of
comparative theory is not different in kind from the efficiency theories
qualified by context which have been embraced by other comparatists to
explain differences by diversity in extralegal context. A theory that
predicts efficient developments in law and related institutions but that
admits to interruptions by cultural or political forces is not falsifiable.
What distinguishes the proponents of path dependence, however, is a
concerted effort to detail the cultural and political forces and to place them
in time along the evolutionary path of the countries they study. Yet, some
problem of ex post rationalization remains unless the conditions in which
efficiency defers to culture and politics are defined a priori. This is an
extremely complex and perhaps impossible enterprise. Sidestepping it,
however, will limit what we can learn from foreign systems and, therefore,
our understanding of domestic laws and universal principles of law.
11. BANKRITCY AkS A COIt'ORATh
GOVERNANCE MECHANISM
Several years ago, Lynn LoPucki and I conducted a comparative study
of the bankruptcy reorganization systems of the United States and
Canada.22 We predicted that differences in culture, history and politics
would not affect the functioning of the systems-at least at the level we
were examining-and that despite differences in legislation and even
judicial law, the two systems would work in the same way because of
certain economic imperatives. During the development of bankruptcy law
in Canada, legislators and judges rejected many legal doctrines that are
thought to be fundamental to the operation of the U.S. system of
bankruptcy reorganization, such as the cram down, the estate, the debtor-in-
possession and the debtor's option to assume or reject executory contracts.
Transplant proponents in particular should note that Canadian lawmakers
expressly stated this desire to avoid several key features of the U.S.
system. Our theory predicted that regardless of differences in doctrine or
in political, cultural and social contexts, common functional imperatives
would cause the two systems to converge over time. Economic
Contracting: Increasing Returns, Herd Behavior and Cognitive Biases, 74 Wash. U. L.Q.
347 (1996); see aso MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLmCAL RooTs
OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE (1994); Black & Kraakman, supra note 6; Gilson & Roe,
supra note 5.
22. LoPucki & Triantis, supra note 10.
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imperatives not only influence the evolution of law in the legislatures and
in the courts, but more importantly, they determine the reactions of private
parties to legal rules. The evidence supported our thesis. We found, for
example, a guillotine rule in Canadian legislation that provides for the
liquidation of a debtor firm if a restructuring proposal is voted down by the
creditors. In contrast, the U.S. Bankruptcy Code does not prevent the
debtor from filing a new plan. It is quite common in Canada, however, for
the parties to hold a straw poll in order to avoid the guillotine. The cost
to the parties of reaching an agreement to circumvent the rule is low
enough in this case that the difference in the law in the books is of little
functional significance. We uncovered many other instances of the same
phenomenon. In each reorganization case under the Canadian bankruptcy
legislation, a licensed trustee must agree to act and must approve of the
cash flow statement required to be filed by the debtor. In most Chapter 11
cases in the U.S., a trustee is not appointed. The debtor's attorney,
however, serves many of the same gatekeeping functions as the Canadian
trustee. Thus, even if law makers are indifferent or mistaken to some
degree as to the merits of legal rules, the evolution of extralegal institutions
and conventions are predicted to push the systems toward similar patterns
of behavior.
One might argue that our conclusions missed the point. It should not
be surprising that two countries as similar as the U.S. and Canada would
have reorganization systems that share common functional objectives.
What is probably more interesting is the differences in the mechanisms
used in each country to fulfill those functions. Before looking at
comparative data, an investigator should specify the level of detail which
is or is not relevant. To borrow terminology from Sir Otto Kahn-Freund,
we need to decide to what extent it is more informative to act as a
comparative physiologist rather than a comparative anatomist.23 A reader
of the comparative study that LoPucki and I wrote may find the differences
in doctrinal tools more interesting than the similarities in function."4
Moreover, it is significant that the same function may be achieved at a
higher cost in one system than another because of the need to work around
different rules and institutions in each.
23. Kahn-Freund urged the comparative lawyer to see himself or herself as "a
comparative physiologist rather than as a comparative anatomist." Kahn-Freund, supra note
4, at 45.
24. Jean Braucher makes this point persuasively in this issue. Jean Braucher,
Harmonizing the Business Bankruptcy Systems of Developed and Developing Nations:
Some Issues, 17 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 473 (1997).
1997]
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
In the commercial context, bankruptcy law is conventionally viewed
as a process that resolves the financial distress or insolvency of a business
enterprise. In a classic statement of the purpose of bankruptcy law,
Thomas Jackson stated that bankruptcy prevents the destruction of going
concern value by the exercise of individual creditor remedies against the
assets of a financially distressed firm. 5 This perspective views insolvency
as the problem and bankruptcy as the solution to that financial problem.
There is, however, an easier way than a bankruptcy proceeding to
avoid financial distress-firms might borrow less and rely more on equity
financing. Given that the vast majority of business entities are leveraged,
any theory of bankruptcy law must start with an explanation of a firm's
decision to issue debt rather than equity and of observed patterns of debt
contracting. Recent scholarship has begun to clarify the role of debt in
deterring and correcting managerial slack: for example, lapses in
managerial competence or effort, excessive managerial compensation or
perquisite consumption, and managerial entrenchment that diminish the
value of the firm.26 Often, managerial slack is a failure to respond in a
timely manner to changes in the firm's environment. 27 A number of
mechanisms deter and correct slack while the firm is solvent. For example,
shareholders exercise their voting rights and engage in proxy contests to
remove incompetent or ineffective management. If incumbent shareholders
remain passive (perhaps because of a collective action problem) in the face
of inefficient management, they too must be replaced. As the invisible
hand would have it, there is an incentive for third parties to acquire voting
control through the purchase of shares and to remove management. Debt,
and particularly the enforcement rights that accompany it, can complement
the disciplinary effect of governance measures such as shareholder voting
and hostile takeovers, by setting trip wires that instigate the removal of
managers and redeployment of assets. The critical purpose of debt is to
cause financial distress at times when, despite the availability of other
devices to keep managers in line, firm assets are not being optimally
deployed. Default and insolvency alert debtholders (as well as other
stakeholders) to the possibility of such inefficiency and thereby prompt the
correction of managerial slack. When debt is concentrated in the hands of
a sophisticated party such as a bank, its intervention (or threat of
intervention) can correct the problem in management. At other times,
25. THOMAS H. JACKSON, THIE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW, ch. 1 (1986).
26. Triantis & Daniels, supra note 9.
27. Id.; Michael C. Jensen, The Modem Industrial Revolution, Exit and the Failure of
Internal Control Systems, 48 J. FIN. 831 (1993).
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however, the principal debtholder may not be qualified to assume that role
or the firm's debt may be widely dispersed.
Bankruptcy provides a collective mechanism to the same remedial
objective. It is therefore a serious policy error to regard bankruptcy as a
method of solving financial distress while preserving the debtor's going
concern value. The financial distress is a signal of the need for economic
restructuring to enhance going concern value. Bankruptcy should facilitate
the correction of managerial slack and improvements in the efficiency of
asset deployment. Resolving the financial distress without addressing these
efficiency concerns is as dangerous as disconnecting a ringing fire alarm
without ascertaining the location or cause of the fire.
Thus, a theory of bankruptcy should start with the following
postulates. First, financial distress or insolvency is typically not the
problem, but a symptom of the underlying economic problem-a
mismanagement of business assets. This mismanagement need not be
anything sinister or grossly negligent; it can be simply the failure to
respond in a timely fashion to exogenous changes in economic conditions.
Second, when invoked, bankruptcy acts as a governance mechanism to
correct the managerial slack and corresponding economic inefficiency. It
might be characterized as a governance measure of last resort which comes
into play after shareholders have failed to correct the problem and when
there is no dominant lender with expertise and concentrated holding of the
firm's debt. Third, bankruptcy is therefore about enhancing the value of
firm assets, rather than simply preserving the value by resolving the
financial distress. To be sure, there may be non-governance motivations
for postponing financial distress through a bankruptcy process. For
instance, bankruptcy can defer the layoff of workers or can postpone the
sale of firm assets to permit the dissemination of information to potential
buyers.28 Yet, a bankruptcy regime that pursued only the latter would be
an ineffective governance tool and would largely undermine the
disciplinary value of debt. To translate the foregoing normative theory into
positive terms, one would expect that parties would either contract around
a bankruptcy regime that did not address the governance issue or firms
would issue significant amounts of debt only to a single dominant (and
probably secured) lender. A theory that regards bankruptcy (either
liquidation or reorganization) as a governance mechanism can nevertheless
yield a number of testable hypotheses.
28. On the information-producing properties of bankruptcy proceedings, see Triantis,
The Interplay, supra note 10.
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The focus of this conference is the bankruptcy regimes of emerging
nations. Their economic and political conditions contrast sharply with
those of the U.S. Before constructing these hypotheses, it is useful to
outline in very broad terms some features of emerging economies. They
are characterized by weak legal and market institutions. Their judiciary is
relatively unsophisticated and sometimes corrupt. Their factor and product
markets are often not competitive and their capital markets consist of
relatively unsophisticated players. In the transition economies, ownership
is often held by managers and employees. In emerging countries of the
third world, ownership of business entities tends to be concentrated in
families. Liquid markets for equity interests are in their infancy and there
is limited turnover in control positions. There being little external finance
and therefore little separation between ownership and control, decision
makers typically have reasonably appropriate incentives to maximize firm
value and they are monitored by holders of concentrated interests, often
within their own families. There is often an extensive web of interfirm
shareholdings and trading among cross-held entities. Sources of external
financing are limited, however, and to the extent that external financing
exists, it tends to be dominated by commercial banks. In the absence of
liquid debt markets, the banks hold and exercise considerable monitoring
authority and should be willing to intervene at the first signs of financial
or economic distress. Given that most financing comes from retained
earnings, interfirm transfers within families of companies and bank lending,
emerging economies bear a closer resemblance to the patterns of financing
and governance in Japan than the U.S.
The last-resort governance role of the collective process of bankruptcy
is of much less significance in this account of financing patterns in
emerging nations than it is in the U.S. economy, which is characterized by
more dispersed holdings of debt and equity interests, liquid capital markets
and a separation of ownership and control. In emerging markets with
concentrated ownership and substantial cross-holdings, owners are a more
reliable disciplinary force, as is the principal lender. The need for either
takeover activity or a collective governance process in bankruptcy is less
pressing and, at the same time, the various stakeholders may have
misgivings about turning over significant business decisions to less
experienced courts. As a first stab and without identifying cause and
effect, it is reasonable to expect to see more intricate bankruptcy regimes
(i.e. beyond individual creditor remedies) being used in countries with
dispersed holdings of debt and equity and sophisticated courts. In the
emerging nations, we would predict instead a more urgent economic and
political emphasis on the protection of property rights, a market for
business assets and the evolution of individual creditor enforcement
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remedies. To be sure, more complex bankruptcy schemes might be
transplanted from the more to less developed economies as a result of
interactions among lawyers, academics and policy makers. Transplanting
may explain how statutes that go beyond individual creditor collection
devices get in the books in transition or emerging nations. However, a
transplanted set of rules or institutions may remain unused. To argue, for
instance, that the advice of American experts contributed to the enactment
of a reorganization statute in an emerging country is quite different from
saying that the statute operates as such and is in fact used as a collective
governance mechanism rather than, for example, a tax collection device.
If nothing else, the country may lack the judicial infrastructure
(courthouses, filing systems, judges, etc.) to support a more elaborate
regime.
IV. CONCLUSION
Corporate law scholars have made important steps toward identifying
a limited number of governance patterns in the leading industrialized
nations. Debt is increasingly viewed as a factor in corporate governance
and therefore the bankruptcy process must be integrated into these patterns
of governance. Even in the shadow of path dependence, if we believe that
efficiency drives much of the evolution of legal rules and institutions, we
would expect to find that some things go with others and some
configurations do not survive. This allows us to isolate a finite number of
patterns of governance and provides us with falsifiable hypotheses. With
the functional data produced in this conference and, I hope, others like it
in the future, our understanding of the mechanisms of corporate governance
and decision making will grow immeasurably.
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